Participants 140
The most significant single advantage that BAWV and AADV have is that they gather both of the two voter inputs that best enable a method to identify the correct winner. Allowing voters to express their dissatisfaction for some candidates they don’t like means that BAWV and AADV can avoid the ridiculous blunder of choosing a winner that most voters dislike. The importance of this has been long recognized by some groups (e.g. Libertarians) who always have NOTA (None of the Above) as a “candidate” on every ballot. However, NOTA is a blunt instrument; a vote for NOTA is a vote against all other candidates. A vote against a specific “worst” candidate is much more “surgical” and discriminative.
Perhaps the best way to think about BAWV and AADV is that they conduct a separate “yes or no” referendum on each of the candidates. Referenda are used for up-or-down votes on a specific issue and often to determine whether or not voters wish to retain a judge. When there are multiple candidates, the candidate that wins its referendum by the largest amount becomes the overall winner of the race. Voters are allowed to vote “yes” in the referendum of the candidate they think is best, and they also have the option to vote “no” in the referendum of the candidate they think is worst. As with any referendum, “no” votes subtract from the “yes” votes.
AADV permits voters to also vote “yes” in the referendum of a second candidate. This is done to remove any disincentive to sincerely vote for a true first choice (while allowing AADV to be a direct-score method). There is no reason to not do so since it is also possible to vote for a “lesser evil” candidate if there is one. However, there is no way to vote for the lesser evil without increasing the probability that the lesser-evil candidate will defeat the first choice candidate.
BAWV, on the other hand, gives voters the option to specify an “alternate best choice” (which would be the lesser evil when one exists). Since BAWV is an iterative-elimination method, designating an alternate does not in any way affect the first choice, unless and until that first choice has actually been eliminated. If and when a ballot’s first choice is actually eliminated, the alternate choice (if any) is then immediately promoted to best and acts exactly as though the voter had originally chosen that candidate as best.
Neither of these methods is particularly challenging for voters. Instructions to voters might read as below.
Instructions to Voters (AADV): Mark an “X” in the “Approved” box for any one or two candidate(s) (if any) that you really like and believe would be the best one(s) to win this race. Mark an “X” in the “Disapproved” box for any one candidate (if any) that you strongly believe would be the worst choice and which you would not want to win this race. If you do not know enough about a candidate or do not have a strong opinion one way or the other, leave both boxes unmarked. Do not mark more than one box for any single candidate.
Instructions to Voters (BAWV): Mark an “X” in the “Best” box for one candidate (if any) that you really like and believe would be the best one to win this race. Mark an “X” in the “Alternate” box for one candidate (if any) that you would like to have counted as your best choice in the event that your best choice is eliminated. Note that marking a candidate as alternate cannot help or hurt any candidate, and will not count in any way unless and until your best choice has actually been eliminated. Mark an “X” in the “Worst” box of one candidate (if any) that you dislike and would not want to win this race. If you do not know enough about a candidate or do not have a strong opinion one way or the other, leave all three boxes unmarked. Do not mark more than one box for any single candidate.
Note that the result of a referendum might be positive, zero or negative (more “No” votes than “Yes” votes). That is a very good thing and it is what will prevent election of a candidate that is disliked by most voters. Although a negative candidate score is always possible, it would not be expected to occur often. Political parties (and everyone) would quickly realize that polarizing candidates or ones with “high negatives” are not likely to win and nominating such divisive candidates is no longer the way to win elections! Unlike with Plurality, the way to win elections must be to nominate candidates with broad support and few negatives. This is a far healthier situation and should reduce, rather than exacerbate polarization.
There is one more consequence that the possibility of near-zero or negative scores brings. Suppose that all political parties act stupidly (who would think that possible?) and nominate all terrible candidates. It might then be possible for a relatively few positive write-in votes to elect a virtually unknown candidate. That might well be the best outcome, but most people would likely find it somewhat disturbing. That unlikely but disquieting possibility can be easily prevented by disqualifying any candidate(s) that had “too few” voters who weighed in on them. This hurdle should not be very high. The first step in tallying AADV and BAWV is to total the number of voters each candidate had (includes all positive, negative and alternate voters). Any candidate is disqualified whose voter total is less than one plus 1% of the highest number of voters that any single candidate received. Below are the detailed instructions.
Instructions to Election Officials (AADV): Disqualify any ballots which have more than one box marked for the same candidate. Disqualify any ballots which have more than two candidates marked “Approved.” Disqualify any ballots which have more than one candidate marked “Disapproved.” Total the “Approved” votes for each candidate; call this total “A.” Total the “Disapproved” votes for each candidate; call this total “D.” Add “A” and “D” for each candidate; call this sum “V.” Eliminate any candidate whose “V” is less than one plus one percent (rounded to the nearest number of voters) of the largest “V” that any single candidate received. Subtract “D” from “A” for each remaining candidate; call this difference “N.” Eliminate any candidate which has a negative N. The remaining candidate (if any) that has the largest “N” is the winner.
Instructions to Election Officials (BAWV):
- Disqualify any ballots which have more than one box marked for the same candidate. Disqualify any ballots which have more than one candidate marked “Best.” Disqualify any ballots which have more than one candidate marked “Alternate.” Disqualify any ballots which have more than one candidate marked “Worst.”
- Total the “Best” votes for each candidate; call this total “B.” Total the “Alternate” votes for each candidate; call this number “A.” Total the “Worst” votes for each candidate; call this total “W.” Add “B” plus “A” plus “W” for each candidate; call this sum “V.” Compute one plus one percent (rounded to the nearest number of voters) of the largest “V” that any single candidate received; call this number “MV.”
- Eliminate any candidate that has a “V” less than “MV.” Upon eliminating each candidate, unmark the “Best” “box” for any ballots which have selected the candidate being eliminated as “Best.” For any ballot on which the “Best” box is being unmarked and for which an “Alternate” is marked, change the “Alternate” candidate to “Best.”
- Total the “Best” votes for each candidate; call this total “B.” Subtract “W” from “B” for each remaining candidate; call this difference “N.”
- If only one candidate remains and its “N” is not negative, declare that candidate the winner. If either no candidates remain or one remains, but with negative “N,” there is no winner.
- Eliminate the candidate which has the lowest positive (or most negative) “N.” (If there should be a tie for lowest “N,” then eliminate the tied candidate which has the lowest “V.”) Unmark the “Best” “box” for any ballots which have selected the candidate being eliminated as “Best.” For any ballot on which the “Best” box is being unmarked and for which an “Alternate” is marked, change the “Alternate” candidate to “Best.” Go back to step 4.
The tally procedure is more complex than what is required for Plurality. AADV certainly can be done manually without difficulty. BAWV also could be done manually with some additional difficulty, but automating it would make so much sense.
That brings us to the topic of utilizing modern technology for elections. It would seem that we should have been utilizing the tremendous power and flexibility of digital computers at least for the last quarter century, even with simplistic Plurality. The reason that hasn’t happened is that no one has yet done a good job of it. People are justifiably afraid of mixing elections and technology because of the many mistakes that have been made attempting to do so. Many of these mistakes have put the integrity of elections in jeopardy. The subject of election integrity is a crucial one deserving of careful attention, but is beyond the scope of this course.
No one can guarantee that any machine of at least the complexity of a paper stapler will function correctly 100% of the time. Therefore, each and every output of a machine must actually be checked and verified as a part of normal operating procedure. There also must be a durable (e.g. paper) audit trail that is the official record of voters’ intents. A system meeting these requirements is already available; it supports a choice of Plurality, AADV or BAWV. More information can be found here: http://royminet.org/election-manager-software/
It seems sufficiently clear that either AADV or BAWV (BAWV preferred) can provide the needed large improvement in both the accuracy and the consistency of choosing the candidate that maximizes voters’ satisfaction. The improvement is so significant that it would qualitatively change the functioning of elections for the better. There is no reason Plurality (and IRV) could not be replaced as soon as the will to do so can be marshaled. Considering the accumulating damage Plurality is causing, this should happen sooner rather than later.
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